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RACIAL BALANCING PROVISIONS AND
CHARTER SCHOOLS: ARE CHARTER
SCHOOLS OUT ON A CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMB?
Preston C. Green, III*
Critics have claimed that our public educational system has
failed to develop innovative ideas, attract exceptional teachers,
or hold incompetent teachers and administrators accountable
2
1
for their students' inability to learn. Thirty-six states, the
3
4
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have attempted to ad* Department of Educational Policy, Research, and Administration, School of
Education, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
1. JOE NATHAN, CHARTER SCHOOLS: CREATING HOPE AND OPPORTUNITY FOR
AMERICAN EDUCATION (1996).
(1) Alaska, ALASKA STAT. §§ 14.03.250-.290 (Michie 2000); (2) Arizona, ARIZ. REV.
STAT. §§ 15-181-15-189.03 (2000); (3) Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-23-101- 507 (Michie 2000); (4) California, CAL. ED. CODE§§ 47600- 47664 (Deering, 2000); (5) Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 22-30.5-101- 209 (1999); (6) Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 10-66aa-gg (1999); (7) Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit.14, §§ 501-516 (1999); (8)
Florida, FLA. STAT. chs. 228.056-.058 (1999); (9) Georgia, GA. CODE §§ 20-2-20602071 (2000); (10) Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 302A-1181-1188 (2000); (11) Idaho,
IDAHO CODE§§ 33-5201-5212 (2000); (12) Illinois, 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/27A-15/32-2.13 (West 2000); (13) Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-1903-1910 (1999); (14)
Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. §§ 17:3971-4001 (2000); (15) Massachusetts, MAss. ANN.
LAWS ch. 71 § 89 (Law. Co-op. 2000); (16) Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 380.501518 (2000); (17) Minnesota, MINN. STAT. §§ 124D.10-.11 (1999); (18) Mississsippi,
MISS. REV. STAT. §§ 37-28-1-21 (2000); (19) Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 160.400.420 (1999); (20) Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 386.500-.610 (Michie 2000); (21)
New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 194-8:1-22 (1999); (22) New Jersey, N.J.
STAT. §§ 18A:36A-1-18 (West 1999); (23) New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-8B-18C-7 (Michie 2000); (24) New York, N.Y. C.L.S EDUC. §§ 2850-2857 (McKinney 2000);
(25) North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-238.29A-K (1999); (26) Ohio, OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 3314.01- .020 (Anderson 2000); (27) Oklahoma, 70 OKLA. STAT. §§ 3130-152 (1999); (28) Oregon, 1999 Or. Laws 200 (1999); (29) Pennsylvania, 24 PA.
STAT.§§ 17-1701-A-1732-A (2000); (30) Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS§§ 16-77-2-771.5 (2000); (31) South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-40-10-190 (Law Co-op. 1998);
(32) Texas, TEX. EDUC. CODE§§ 12.101-.118 (West 1999); (33) Utah, UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 53A-1a-501-514 (2000); (34) Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22.1-212.5-.15 (Michie
2000); (35) Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. § 118.40 (1999); (36) Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. §§
21-3-201-207 (Michie 2000).
3. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 31-2801-2853.25 (1999).
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dress these problems through the creation of charter schools.
Charter schools are autonomous, or semi-autonomous, public
schools that are created by a contract, or charter, between the
school's organizers and a sponsor, usually the state's depart5
ment of education or a local school district. The creators of
charter schools are held accountable for achieving educational
results. In return, the charter school receives waivers exempting it from many of the restrictions that apply to traditional
6
public schools.
Many observers fear that charter schools will provide school
officials the means to help white parents escape from racially
7
desegregated public schools. Several states have responded to
this concern by adopting statutes that require charter schools
to reflect the racial and ethnic composition of the surrounding
8
school districts. Statistical evidence does not support the concern that charter schools will lead to white flight; few charter
schools have a disproportionately high percentage of white students.9 On the contrary, a high percentage of charter schools
have a disproportionately high percentage of racial minorities.10 In fact, rigid enforcement of charter school racial balancing provisions might prevent the development of charter
schools that will benefit minority communities.
States should rescind their charter school racial balancing
provisions. The two primary policy rationales for adopting
these provisions are that desegregated schools: (1) have a positive correlation to academic achievement; and (2) increase the
likelihood of minority students to achieve long-term success in
society. The research on mandatory desegregation policies does
not support these two policy assertions. Furthermore, the experiences of African-Americans in desegregated schools suggest
that racial balancing provisions do not benefit minority communities.
Additionally, racial balancing provisions probably violate

4. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2501-2585 (1999).
5. NATHAN, supra note 1.
6. ld.
7. David J. Dent, Diversity Rules Threaten North Carolina Charter Schools that
Aid Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1998, at B8.
8. See infra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
9. RPP INT'L, A NATIONAL STUDY OF CHARTER SCHOOLS: SECOND-YEAR REPORT
(1998).
10. ld.
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the Equal Protection Clause. All race-based governmental classifications must pass a two-prong test: (1) they must satisfy a
compelling government interest; and (2) they must be narrowly
11
tailored to that interest. Charter school racial balancing provisions fail both parts of this test.
The first section of this paper provides an overview of the
charter school movement, the second section explains the educational deficiencies of charter school racial balancing provisions, and the third discusses why charter school racial balancing provisions probably violate the Equal Protection Clause.

I.

OVERVIEW OF THE CHARTER SCHOOL MOVEMENT

In 1983, the National Commission of Excellence warned in
its influential report, A Nation at Risk, that the public schools
were failing their mission to educate students by creating a
"rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a
12
Nation and a people." Charter schools are part of a wave of
educational reforms designed to remedy the perceived inade13
quacy of the public schools. Supporters believe that charter
schools would encourage competition, provide new models of
14
schooling, and create incentives to improve the public schools.
The federal government has also provided statutory financial
15
support to the charter school movement.
Individual states determine the circumstances under which
a charter school may be established. Despite this potential for
variability, charter schools have several common characteristics. First, states relieve charter schools of certain state laws
and regulations in exchange for the charter school's commit11. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).
12. DAVID P. GARDNER. ET AL., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR
EDUCATIONAL REFORM. AN OPEN LETTER TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. A REPORT TO Tim
NATION AND THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION 5 (1983).
13. Jennifer T. Wall, The Establishment of Charter Schools: A Guide to Legalissues for Legislatures, 1998 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 69 n.2 (1998).
14. NATHAN, supra note 1.
15. State educational agencies may use part of the money received under the
Goals 2000: Educate America Act for the promotion of charter schools. 20 U.S.C.S. §
5888 (Law. Co-op. 1999). Title I of the Improving America's Schools Act of 1994 also
seeks to encourage the development of charter schools through financial assistance,
and evaluative studies. 20 U.S.C.S. §§ 8061-8067 (Law. Co-op. 1999). President William Clinton, in his State of the Union Address, called for the creation of 3,000 charter
schools by the twenty-first century. President William Clinton, State of the Union Address (Feb. 4, 1997).
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ment, by means of a contract, to achieve specific outcomes.
Charter schools may not charge tuition, but utilize per pupil
17
state aid dollars to fund their efforts. Schools must outline
their mission and curricular focus and undergo a review proc18
ess to qualify for charter school status. Third, once those proposing a school have adequately justified their educational plan
to the sponsor, they must enter into a contract to deliver those
19
services to the children who will elect to attend. If the charter
school fails to meet its goals, it must develop an educational
plan in which it explains how it will accomplish the goals of the
20
charter. If the charter school continues to fail, the sponsor
21
may revoke the charter.

II.

CHARTER SCHOOLS P.ND RACIAL BALANCING PROVISIONS

Many observers fear that public officials will use charter
schools to enable white parents and students to escape from
22
desegregated public schools. This concern has a historical basis: after the Supreme Court had outlawed separate-but-equal
2
education in Brown v. Board of Education, segregationists
proposed school choice programs to circumvent school desegre24
gation efforts. Nine states have responded to the concerns
raised by charter school critics by enacting statutes, which ensure that the population of a charter school reflects the racial
and ethnic composition of the school district as a whole. Cali. 2s Fl on.d a, 26 w·Isconsin,
. 27 an d w yarning
. zs reqmre
•
eac h
fiorma,
16. Julie F. Mead & Preston C. Green. Making Promises: Have Charter Schools
Resurrected Educational Malpractice as a Cause of Action? Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Montreal, April 22,
1998 (1998) (paper on file with the author).
17. ld.
18. Id.
19. ld.
20. Id.
21. ld.
22. Dent, supra note 7.
23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24. Stephen Eisdorfer, Colloquium, Racial Ceilings and School Choice: Public
School Choice and Racial Integration, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 937 (1993).
25. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47605(b)(5)(G) (West 2000) ("The governing board of the
school district shall not deny a petition for the establishment of a charter school
unless ... [t]he petition [fails to, inter alia] contain reasonably comprehensive descriptions [of] ... [t]he means by which the school will achieve a racial and ethnic balance
among its pupils that is reflective of the general population residing within the territorial jurisdiction of the school district to which the charter petition is submitted.").
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charter school to adopt policies that will ensure such racial and
29
30
ethnic balance. The statutes of Kansas, Minnesota, and
31
North Carolina specifically require the charter school's racial
and ethnic composition to reflect that of the surrounding school
32
33
district. Nevada and South Carolina go further still by requiring the racial and ethnic population of a charter school to
differ by not more than ten percent from the racial composition
of the surrounding school district.
Statistical evidence does not support the concern that charter schools will lead to white flight from traditional public
schools. On the contrary, evidence suggests that minority
communities are leaving traditional public schools to attend
charter schools. A study of 16 charter school states, funded by
the United States Department of Education, found that only

26. FLA. STAT. § 228.056(9)(a)(8) (1999) ("The ... criteria for approval of the charter shall be based on [inter alia] ... [t]he ways by which the school will achieve a raciaVethnic balance reflective of the community it serves or within the raciaVethnic
range of other public schools in the same school district.").
27. WIS. STAT. § 118.40(b)(9) (1999) ("The [charter school] petition shall include ... [t]he means by which the school will achieve a racial and ethnic balance
among its pupils that is reflective of the school district population.").
28. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-3-203(b)(vii) (Michie 2000) ("The board may grant a
charter for the operation of a school ... if it determines the petition contains [inter
alia] ... [t]he means by which the school will achieve a racial and ethnic balance
among its pupils that is reflective of the general population residing within the territorial jurisdiction of the school district to which the charter petition is submitted.").
29. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1906(d)(2) (1999) ("Pupils in attendance at the school
must be reasonably reflective of the racial and socio-economic composition of the school
district as a whole.").
30. MINN. STAT. § 124D.10 Subdiv. 9(3) (1999) ("A charter school may limit admission to ... residents of a specific geographic area where the percentage of the population of non-Caucasian people of that area is greater than the percentage of the nonCaucasian population in the congressional district in which the geographic area is located, and as long as the school reflects the racial and ethnic diversity of the specific
area.").
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-238.29F(g)(5)(ii) (1999) ("Within one year after the
charter school begins operation, the population of the school shall reasonably reflect
the racial and ethnic composition of the general population residing within the local
school administrative unit in which the school is located or the racial and ethnic composition of the special population that the school seeks to serve residing within the local school administrative unit in which the school is located.").
32. NEV. REV. STAT. § 386.580(1) (Michie 2000) ("[T]he charter school shall, if
practicable, ensure that the racial composition of pupils enrolled in the charter school
does not differ by more than 10 percent from the racial composition of pupils who attend public schools in the zone in which the charter school is located.").
33. S.C. CODE ANN§ 59-40-50(B)(6) (Law. Co-op 1998) ("[U]nder no circumstances
may a charter school enrollment differ from the racial composition of the school district
by more than ten percent.").
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four percent of the charter schools in the sample were disproportionately white: that is, served 20 percent more white stu34
dents than the districts in which they were located. However,
the study also found that: (1) one out of three charter schools
had a disproportionately high percentage of minority students;35 and (2) approximately 40 percent of charter schools
that enrolled predominantly African-American students were
located in districts where the average white enrollment was
36
more than 50 percent.
There are two possible reasons for this high percentage of
predominantly minority charter schools. First, many charter
schools are designed to address the needs of particular popula37
tions. The Department of Education study found that the second most cited reason for starting a charter school was to meet
38
the needs of a particular population of children. Charter
schools also provide many minority parents, who feel disenfranchised in traditional public schools, the opportunity to become more involved with the design of their children's educa39
tional program. Moreover, charter school statutes create
incentives to design educational programming that will benefit
minority students. For example, the statutes of several states
encourage proposals to focus on the needs of "at risk" students.
41
40
42
43
Colorado, Illinois, New York, and North Carolina give

34. RPP INT'L, supra note 9, at 56.
35. Id. at 72.
36. I d. at 64.
37. I d. at 62.
38. ld.
39. Robin D. Barnes, Group Conflict and the Constitution: Race, Sexuality, and
Religion: Black America and School Choice: Charting a New Course, 106 YALE L.J.
2375 (1997).
40. COLO. REV. STAT § 22-30.5-109(3) (1999) ("It is the intent of the general assembly that priority of consideration be given to charter school applications designed to
increase the educational opportunities of at-risk pupils.").
41. ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/27A-8(3)(West 2000) ("In evaluating any charter school
proposal submitted to it, the local school board shall give preference to proposals
that ... are designed to enroll and serve a substantial proportion of at-risk children.").
42. N.Y. C.L.S EDUC. § 2852(2)(c) (McKinney 2000) ("In reviewing applications,
the charter entity is encouraged to give preference to applications that demonstrate the
capability to provide comprehensive learning experiences to students identified by the
applicants as at risk of academic failure.").
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-238.29C(b)(iiil (1999) ("In reviewing applications for
the establishment of charter schools within a local school administrative unit, the chartering entity is encouraged to give preference to applications that demonstrate the capability to provide comprehensive learning experiences to students identified by the
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preference to charter school proposals that serve at-risk chil44
dren, while Oregon provides grants and loans to charter
schools that meet this need.
Second, many charter schools that are attractive to minorities have experienced a difficult time convincing white parents
to enroll their children. There are several explanations for this
inability to recruit whites. Some white parents may not be educationally interested in charter schools that have educational
45
themes that are attractive to minority students. Additionally,
some white parents may fear the neighborhoods in which some
46
minority-theme charter schools are located. The Healthy
Start Academy, a charter school located in Durham, North
Carolina is a case in point. Located in a black neighborhood,
the charter school was able to attract only two white students,
47
even after engaging in an intense recruitment process.
The enforcement of charter school racial balancing provisions might prevent the development of charter schools that
address the educational concerns of minority communities. The
experience of North Carolina's charter schools supports this assertion. In 1998, 22 of the North Carolina's 60 charter schools
were not in compliance with the state's racial balancing provision;48 all but one of these 22 schools were predominantly
49
black. The teachers' union and several state legislators called
for the schools to comply with the state's racial balancing pro50
vision within a year or be closed. The Healthy Start Academy
filed suit in trial court to challenge the constitutionality of the
51
statute's racial balancing provision. A legal challenge was

applicants as at risk of academic failure.").
44. OR. REV. STAT. § 338.152(2) (1999) ("Pursuant to rules adopted by the State
Board of Education, the Department of Education shall award grants and loans on the
basis of need. Priority for awarding grants and loans shall be to those public charter
schools serving at-risk youth.").
45. For example, Harvest Preparatory School, a Minneapolis charter school, combines an Afrocentric curriculum with an emphasis on basic skills. John Ramsay, A Direct Challenge; An Irresistible Question Presented Itself as an Educator Studied an Urban School's Highly Touted, But Controversial, Reading Program: Would It Work for
His Preschooler?, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Jul. 9, 1998.
46. Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Thernstrom, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE
258 (1997) (discussing white fear of black neighborhoods).
47. Dent, supra note 7.
48. !d.
49. !d.
50. !d.
51. Christopher Kirkpatrick, Lawsuit Tests Charter School Race Clause: Healthy

72

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2001

avoided after the chairman of the state board of education
promised not to take action against schools that are not in
52
compliance with the state's racial balancing provision.
States should rescind their racial balancing provisions so as
not to prevent the development of charter schools that address
minority concerns. The two primary policy rationales for adopting these provisions build upon the arguments used for adopting mandatory desegregation policies such as busing. The first
claim is that desegregated schools have a positive correlation to
academic achievement. For example, more than 40 years ago,
less than 50 percent of young black adults had obtained high
school diplomas or passed the General Educational Development (GED) Test; by 1993, this figure had increased to 83 per3
cent, close to white completion rate. 5
The second claim is that desegregated schools increase the
likelihood of minority students to achieve long-term success in
society. Predominantly minority schools tend to have high rates
54
of poverty. High poverty schools generally have low test
scores, high dropout rates, and a low percentage of students
5
who will eventually attend college. 5 According to a field of educational research known as "perpetuation theory," minorities
who attend poor, segregated schools may become isolated from
mainstream society, thus losing out on opportunity to enter
56
into the middle class. School desegregation helps minority
7
students break out of this cycle of isolation. 5 In support of this
thesis, proponents of perpetuation theory cite studies showing
that students attending desegregated schools are more likely to

Start Academy, N.C. Conservative Group Join Forces, HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.),
Aug. 15, 1998, at A6.
52. The chairman stated that no action would be taken against any charter school
that would attempt to be diverse. Christopher Kirkpatrick, Charter School Bill Still
Stalled on Racial Issues: Lawmakers Shelve Diversity Clause until Next Session,
HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), Oct. 5, 1998, at Bl. However, states should not follow
the route suggested by the chairman by amending charter school statutes to require
charter schools to attempt to be racially and ethnically diverse. Schools with educational themes that target special populations would still have a difficult time attracting
students who are members of that group.
53. GARY 0RFIELD ET. AL. DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL
OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 85 (1996).
54. ld. at 53.
55. Id.
56. ld. at 106.
57. Id.
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succeed in college and have higher occupational aspirations.
The research on mandatory desegregation policies does not
support these two policy assertions. David Armor has conducted a comprehensive examination of mandatory desegregation policies. Although there may be a correlation between
mandatory desegregation policies and African-American
achievement, Armor has found that "the relationship is generally weak and inconsistent compared to the effect of educa59
tional and economic factors." In fact, the improved socioeconomic state of the African-American family and federal
compensatory programs such as Chapter 1 were significantly
60
more important contributors than school desegregation. Armor does find that "the research on long-term outcomes offers
61
the strongest argument for desegregated schools"; however,
he concludes that the studies in this area are inconsistent and
the positive results may be confined to voluntary desegregation
62
plans.
Furthermore, Armor has found that mandatory school de63
segregation policies may actually lower black self-esteem. One
explanation for this finding is the discrimination that many Af64
rican-Americans have experienced in desegregated schools. A
disproportionately high percentage of African-American students attending desegregated public schools are placed in low
65
educational tracks. African-Americans students are also more
likely to be expelled or suspended from desegregated schools
66
than white students are. Moreover, many African-American
parents believe that they have been unable to advocate for
their children's interests in desegregated schools because white
parents and school officials have prevented them from partici67
pating in the schools' decision making process.
Predominantly minority charter schools may be more successful than desegregated schools in meeting the psychological
58.
59.
(1995).

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

!d.
DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 98

!d.
!d. at 113.
!d.
!d. at 101.
!d.
Barnes, supra note 39.
!d.
!d.
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and academic needs of their students. These schools may
strengthen the commitment of minority parents by providing
them with the orportunity to participate in their development
and governance. Charter schools' freedom from state regulations may enable minority parents to develop programs that
69
address the emotional needs of their children. These schools
must also succeed academically, or run the risk of losing the
70
charters. Moreover, rescinding racial balancing provisions
would be consistent with the shift of African-American attitudes toward mandatory desegregation policies. African71
Americans have historically supported desegregation policies.
During the 1990s, however, African-Americans have become
more supportive of all-minority neighborhood schools due to
their frustration with persistent gaps in academic achievement
between blacks and whites and the inconvenience of mandatory
72
desegregation policies. They have also begun to reject the notion that all-black schools are academicall:1 inferior and reduce
7
the motivation of black students to learn.

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF CHARTER SCHOOL RACIAL BALANCING
PROVISIONS

The previous section noted that charter school racial balancing provisions might have the unexpected result of preventing the creation of charter schools that help minority communities. Charter school racial balancing provisions may also be
vulnerable to Equal Protection Clause challenges. The Equal
Protection Clause protects against, among other things, racial
74
classifications by the government. Because racial balancing
provisions employ racial classifications, they should be subject
to strict scrutiny. The purpose of strict scrutiny is "to 'smoke
out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative
body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a

68. Id.
69. ld.
70. ld.
71. Id.
72. Megan Twohey, Desegregation Is Dead, 31 NAT'LJ., Sep. 18, 1999, at 2614.
73. ld.
74. The Equal Protection Clause provides that no state shall "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV,§ 1.
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highly suspect tool." To pass strict scrutiny, all race-based
governmental classifications must satisfy a compelling gov76
ernmental interest and be narrowly tliilored to that interest.
The South Carolina judiciary is presently grappling with
the constitutionality of its racial balancing provision. In Beaufort County Board of Education v. Lighthouse Charter School
Committee, the Beaufort (South Carolina) Board of Education
denied the application for the Lighthouse Charter School, in
part, because the school had failed to explain how it would
comply with the state's requirement that the charter school's
population be within 10 percent of the surrounding school district.77 The Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld the denial
78
of the charter school's application on this ground, but remanded the case to trial court to determine whether the state's
racial balancing provision violated the Equal Protection
79
Clause.
This section examines whether charter school racial balancing provisions would survive Equal Protection Clause challenges. The first subsection examines whether charter school
racial balancing provisions would satisfy compelling governmental interests identified by the Supreme Court. The second
subsection analyzes whether such provisions would satisfy
other compelling interests recognized by legal commentators
and lower federal courts. The third subsection looks at whether
racial balancing provisions would be narrowly tailored.

A Do Racial Balancing Provisions Satisfy Compelling
Governmental Interests Identified by the Supreme Court?
The Supreme Court has recognized two compelling interests
under strict scrutiny analysis: (1) to eliminate the present ef80
fects of past discrimination, and (2) to achieve a diverse stu81
dent body in the context of university admissions decisions.

75. City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989).
76. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235.
77. 516 S.E.2d 655 (S.C. 1999).
78. !d. at 659.
79. Id. at 661.
80. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (plurality opinion);
City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,491-92 (1989); Adarand, 515 U.S. at
237.
81. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-12 (opinion of Powell, J.).
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Courts would probably rule that racial balancing provisions fail
to satisfy the compelling interest of eliminating the present effects of past discrimination. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson,
the Supreme Court invalidated Richmond, Virginia's set-aside
program which required prime contractors to award 30% of the
dollar amount of each contract to one or more minority business enterprises (MBE's). Minority groups consisted of "Blacks
82
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts."
The Court rejected the claim that the set-aside program was
designed to eliminate the present effects of past discrimination
because:
There is absolutely no evidence of past discrimination against
Spanishspeaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut persons
in any aspect of the Richmond construction industry .... It
may well be that Richmond has never had an Aleut or Eskimo
citizen. The random inclusion of racial groups that, as a practical matter, may never have suffered from discrimination in
the construction industry in Richmond suggests that perhaps
the city's purpose was not in fact to remedy past discrimination.83

Similarly, courts would rule that racial balancing provisions are not designed to eliminate the present effects of past
discrimination. They not only apply to charter schools located
in school districts that have discriminated against minority
groups; but they also apply to charter schools located in school
districts that have not committed such discrimination.
Racial balancing provisions also fail to satisfy the compelling interest of obtaining a diverse student body. In Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke, the Supreme Court held
that universities may use race as one of several factors in mak84
ing their admissions decisions. However, the Bakke Court for82. City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 4 78.
83. !d. at 506 (emphasis by the Court).
84. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 (opinion of Powell, J.). The constitutionality of Bakke
is presently being debated in the courts. In Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.
1996), the Fifth Circuit held that a university's use of race to achieve a diverse student
body is unconstitutional because such considerations stigmatized minority applicants,
and contradicted the Equal Protection Clause's primary goal of eliminating all considerations of race. Other circuit courts, however, have to follow the First Circuit's lead.
For example, in Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1999), a case dealing with
the constitutionality of examination school's admissions policies, the First Circuit refused to declare Bakke unconstitutional in the absence of a clear signal from the Supreme Court. !d. at 796. Following the analysis of the First Circuit, this article assumes that Bakke is still good law.
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bade universities from using race and ethnicity as the sole factors for obtaining a diverse student body because: "[t]he diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far
broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element."85 The Court also prohibited universities from taking
steps to obtain a specific racial balance in their student composition:
If petitioner's purpose is to assure within its student body

some specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose
must be rejected not as insubstantial but as facially invalid.
Preferring members of any one group for no reason other than
race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake. This
86
the Constitution forbids.

In Wessmann u. Gittens, the First Circuit applied the logic
of Bakke to pre-collegiate setting. In Wessmann, the First Circuit invalidated the Boston School Committee's admissions policy for its three examination schools. To be eligible for admission, an applicant had to be in the top 50 percent of the school's
87
overall applicant pool. Half of the available seats for an examination school's entering class were allocated according to
88
test scores and grade point averages. The second half were
chosen according to the proportional representation of five different racial and ethnic groups - white, black, Latino, Asian,
and Native American - from the remaining pool of qualified
.
t s. 89
app 11can
Because the admissions policy focused only on racial and
90
ethnic diversity, the First Circuit held that the proportional
representation scheme failed to satisfy the compelling interest
91
test. Instead of achieving diversity, the court concluded that
the School Committee's admissions plan was designed to
achieve racial balancing, which is almost always constitution92
ally forbidden. To justify the use of racial balancing, the court

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 (opinion of Powell, J.).
!d. at 307 (citations omitted).
Wessman, 160 F.3d at 790.
Id.
ld.
!d. at 798.
ld.
ld. at 799.
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found that "a particularly strong showing of necessity would be
93
required." The School Committee failed to meet this burden.
The court rejected the claim that racial balancing protected African-American and Hispanic students from the harmful effects
of racial isolation because the racial isolation argument assumed that students could not function unless they were surrounded by a sufficient number of persons of like race or ethnicity.94 Additionally, the court held that the that School
Committee had failed to demonstrate why the proportional
representation scheme promoted was better than constitutionally permissible alternatives to achieve diversity in promoting
the vigorous exchange of ideas or improving the students' ca95
pacity and willingness to learn.
Applying Bakke and Wessmann, courts would hold that
charter school racial balancing provisions fail to satisfy the
compelling interest of achieving a diverse student body. They
would rule that charter school racial provisions are unconstitutional because race and ethnicity are the only criteria used to
determine diversity. Also, as Wessmann demonstrates, courts
would be highly skeptical of any rationale advanced for adopting a racial balancing provision to obtain a diverse student
body.
B. May Charter School Racial Balancing Provisions Be Used
to Prevent Other Possible Compelling Governmental Interests?
Legal commentators

96

97

and courts have asserted that other

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 799-800.
96. Jason Walbourn, Comment, Strict in Theory, but Not Fatal in Fact: Hunter u.
Regents of the University of California and the Case for Educational Research as a New
Compelling State Interest, 83 MINN. L. REV. 183 (1998) (arguing that educational research can be a compelling governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause);
Note, The Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Admissions Programs in Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, 112 HARV. L. REV. 940 (1999) (arguing that other compelling interests under the Equal Protection Clause could include providing a quality education, and providing equal educational opportunity).
97. Eisenberg v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ., 19 F. Supp. 2d 449 (D.Md. 1998)
(finding that prevention of possible segregative effects of voluntary enrollment policy
constituted compelling governmental interest under Equal Protection Clause); Hunter
v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that educational
research can be a compelling governmental interest under the Equal Protection
Clause); Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High Sch. v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705 (2d. Cir.
1979) (finding that eliminating de facto segregation can serve a compelling governmental interest).
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compelling governmental interests exist besides eliminating
the present effects of past discrimination and achieving a diverse student body. For instance, in Parent Association of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that reducing de facto
segregation serves a compelling government interest. This case
involved a desegregation plan focused primarily on the Andrew
Jackson High School in Queens, New York. Queens had experienced a large influx of minority residents after World War II
and a corresponding departure ofwhite families to the adjacent
98
suburbs. Consequently, Andrew Jackson High School became
99
a virtually all-minority school. The school board adopted a
"Controlled Rate of Change Plan," which permitted black and
Hispanic students to transfer to schools in which white stu100
dents exceeded 50 percent of the student population. White
students could transfer to schools where the white student
101
population was lower than 50 percent. The plan limited the
number of students allowed to transfer in any given year to
those who would not decrease the receiVmg schools'
102
white/minority balance by four percent or more.
Minority students who were not permitted to transfer to desired schools challenged the constitutionality of the choice program.103 The Second Circuit held that it lacked the authority to
compel the school board to achieve a racial balance in the high
school because the seRregation had not been caused by inten04
tional discrimination. Applying strict scrutiny analysis, the
court did find that the school board had a compellinR interest
05
in ensuring that schools were relatively integrated. To ensure such integration, the school board could take steps to
avoid white flight. Although the purpose of the plan was constitutional, the Second Circuit remanded the case to work out
106
spec1'fi1c d e t a1'1 s.
The Supreme Court has also implied that school districts

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson, 598 U.S. at 710.
!d.
!d. at 711.
!d.
!d. at 711-12.
Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson, 738 F.2d 574, 577 (2d. Cir. 1984).
Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson, 598 U.S. at 715.
!d. at 720.
!d. at 721.
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may use racial balancing provisions to eliminate de facto segregation. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education,
the first decision to approve mandatory busing to eliminate official discrimination, the Court observed:
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power
to formulate and implement educational policy and might
well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students
to live in a pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as an educational
policy is within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities; absent a finding of a constitutional violation, however, that would not be within the authority of a federal
107
court.

Although Swann involved official discrimination, this
statement suggests that the Supreme Court would permit race108
based assignments to remedy de facto segregation.
North
Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, a companion case
decided at the same time as Swann, supports this assertion. In
North Carolina State Board of Education, the Court invalidated a state statute forbidding student assignments for the
purpose of achieving a specific racial balance. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court explained that Swann held "as a matter
of educational policy school authorities may well conclude that
some kind of racial balance is desirable quite apart from any
109
constitutional requirements."
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1 provides further
support for the belief that the Supreme Court would uphold the
constitutionality of racial balancing plans designed to eliminate
de facto segregation. In Washington, the Court analyzed the
constitutionality of a Washington statute that prohibited local
school districts from using mandatory busing to upset
neighborhood school enrollment patterns. The Court ruled that
the statute was unconstitutional because it removed authority
to eliminate de facto segregation in a manner that burdened
110
minority interests. If a state could not prohibit a district from
using race-based assignments to eliminate de facto segregation
107. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ .• 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
108. William E. Thro, The Constitutionality Of Eliminating De Facto Segregation
In The Public Schools, 120 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 895, 901 (1997).
109. North Carolina Bd. ofEduc. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971).
110. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 474-75 (1982).

65]

RACIAL BALANCING IN CHARTER SCHOOLS

81

without violating the Equal Protection Clause, then it follows
that local school districts have the right to engap-e in race11
based assignments to remedy de facto segregation.
Despite the implicit endorsement of the Swann, North
Carolina State Board of Education, and Washington cases,
courts would probably find that eliminating the effects of de
facto segregation does not satisfy a compelling governmental
interest. Proponents have advanced several reasons for approving plans that eliminate the effects of de facto segregation, including providing minority students with equal educational opportunit~ and preparing students for a culturally pluralistic
1 2
society.
Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas has been
especially critical of the argument that integration is necessary
to provide minority students with equal educational opportunity. As he asserted in his concurrence in Missouri v. Jenkins:
"[T]here is no reason to think black students cannot learn as
well when surrounded by members of their own race as when
they are in an integrated environment ... black schools can
function as the center and symbol of black communities, and
provide examples of independent black leadership, success, and
113
achievement." Also, courts would find that using racial balancing provisions to achieve cultural diversity would not satisfy a compelling governmental interest. In Bakke, the Supreme Court stated that race could be one of several criteria
114
used to achieve diversity. Therefore, racial balancing provisions would be unconstitutional because they fail to take factors other than race into consideration to achieve cultural pluralism.
School districts could also argue that predominantly onerace charter schools raise an inference of discrimination on the
part of charter school sponsors, and that the state has a compelling interest to prevent sponsors from using charter schools
115
to facilitate racial segregation. Courts would probably refuse
to infer discrimination on the part of charter school sponsors
merely because several charter schools have a disproportion-

111. Thro, supra note 108, at 901.
112. ORFIELD ET. AL., supra note 53.
113. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 95 (Thomas, J., concurring).
114. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 (opinion of Powell, J.).
115. See Eisenberg, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 453 (finding that prevention of possible segregative effects of voluntary enrollment policy constituted compelling governmental
interest under Equal Protection Clause).
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ately high percentage of members from one racial group. In
City of Richmond, the Supreme Court refused to infer that low
participation of minority business enterprises in local contracting agencies was caused by the agencies' discriminatory actions.
There are numerous explanations for this dearth of minority
participation [in construction], including . . . both black and
white career and entrepreneurial choices. Blacks may be disproportionately attracted to industries other than construction .... The mere fact that black membership in these trade
organizations is low, standinfl alone, cannot establish a prima
6
facie case of discrimination."
Future court decisions may reason that the existence of disproportionately one-race charter schools may be caused by factors other than racially exclusionary practices on the part of
charter school sponsors. Many charter schools have educational
themes that are particular to one racial group. For example,
the underlying premise of one of the schools participating in
the U.S. Department of Education study on charter schools is
"the belief that building a strong Afrocentric identity will give
117
the youth the power and strength to succeed in life."
Although these schools are open to all students, their educational
mission may attract a disproportionate number of minority
118
students.

C.

Are Charter School Racial Balancing Provisions Narrowly
Tailored?

Even if charter school racial balancing provisions served a
compelling governmental interest, they must also be narrowly
tailored to satisfy that interest. In United States u. Paradise,
the Supreme Court identified several factors for determining
whether governmental racial classifications were narrowly tailored: (1) the efficacy of alternative race-neutral remedies; (2)
the flexibility of the relief; (3) the duration of the relief; (4) the
relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant population;
and (5) the impact of the policy on third parties. m
Courts would probably find that charter school racial bal-

116.
117.
118.
119.

City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 503.
RPP INT'L, supra note 9, at 67.
Id.
U.S. v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987).
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ancing provisions are not narrowly tailored. First, courts might
conclude that states have failed to establish that less drastic
policies such as voluntary recruitment, or lottery, may be just
as effective for attaining the goals of eliminating the present
effects of past discrimination, or achieving a diverse student
120
body.
Second, courts would find fault with the duration of
these provisions. The Supreme Court has ruled that racial classifications cannot continue in perpetuity, but must have a logi121
cal "stopping point." Charter school racial balancing provisions have no such stopping point: each charter school must
continually ensure that its student population reflects that of
the school district as a whole.
Third, courts would probably find fault with the relationship between the numerical goal and the relevant population.
Charter school racial balancing provisions seek to achieve compelling governmental interests by requiring the racial and ethnic composition of charter schools to reflect that of the surrounding school districts. Courts have expressed doubt that
racial balancing provisions are necessary to achieve compelling
governmental interests. For example, in Tuttle u. Arlington
County School Board, the Fourth Circuit invalidated an alternative school's weighted admission policy, which was designed
to achieve a racial and ethnic population similar to that of the
school district as a whole. The court found that policy's goals of
providing students with the educational benefits of diversity
and helping the school board better meet the needs of a diverse
122
group of students did not require racial balancing.
Finally, courts would conclude that charter school racial
balancing provisions are not sufficiently particularized to cure
harms committed against a class of actual victims. For instance, in Wessmann, the First Circuit found that the Boston
School Committee's proportional representation scheme was
not narrowly tailored to remedy the present effects of past discrimination. Specifically, the court found that the policy was
not focused on the African-American and Hispanic public
school students who were the victims of racial discrimination.
Many of the African-American and Hispanic students benefit120. See e.g., Equal Open Enrollment Ass'n v. Board of Education of the Akron
Cty. Sch. Dist., 937 F. Supp. 700, 708 (N.D.Ohio 1996); Tuttle v. Arlington Cty. Sch.
Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 706 nll (4th Cir. 1999).
121. City o{Richmond, 488 U.S. at 498; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275.
122. Tuttle, 195 F.3d. at 707.
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ing from the policy attended private and parochial schools.
Similarly, courts would find that charter school racial balancing provisions fail the narrow tailoring requirement because
they apply to charter schools in school districts that are not
suffering from the effects of past discrimination. Courts might
also support this conclusion by noting that states have adopted
more particularized approaches that do apply to charter schools
located in school districts that are still experiencing the vestiges of school segregation policies, such as requirin,p charter
12
schools to comply with school desegregation decrees.

IV. CONCLUSION
States should rescind their charter school racial balancing
provisions. While one can argue that such provisions protect
against the development of high-poverty, predominantly minority schools, and enable students to learn in a racially and culturally diverse student body, the experiences of AfricanAmericans in desegregated schools indicate that enforcement of
racial balancing provisions may not benefit minority communities. Also, racial balancing provisions should be rescinded because they violate the Equal Protection Clause. All race-based
governmental classifications must satisfy a compelling government interest and be narrowly tailored to that interest. As
has been shown above, charter school racial balancing provisions likely fail both parts of this test.

123. Wessmann, 190 F.3d at 808.
124. These states are as follows: (1) Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-184(D) (2000) ;
(2) Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-104(3) (1999); (3) Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN.
tit.14, § 506(5) (1999); (4) Illinois, 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27A-4(a) (West 2000); (5)
Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. § 17:3991(C)(3) (2000); (6) Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
386.550(4) (Michie 2000); (7) North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT § 115C-238.29F(g)(5)(ii)
(1999); (8) Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN§ 3314.06 (Anderson 2000); (9) Oklahoma, OKLA.
STAT. § 3-140(8) (1999); (10) Pennsylvania, 24 PA. STAT. § 17-1730-A (2000); (11) Virginia, VA. CODE ANN.§ 22.1-212.6 (A) (Michie 2000).

